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The Impact of Immigration on Financial Markets 
Jesse Baker 




This paper studies the impact of immigration policy on financial markets. I 
estimate the cumulative abnormal returns surrounding two events: the effective start date 
of the Immigration Act of 1990 and the implementation of the Temporary Protected 
Status (TPS) of Nicaragua and Honduras in 1999. Focusing on agriculture, construction, 
and manufacturing firms, I find that the CARs surrounding the events are indeed positive 
and significant, suggesting that the market anticipated growth among industries that are 
likely to hire Central American immigrants. 
Introduction 
Since the election of President Trump, immigration policy has become an 
increasingly central topic in the United States. This debate reached a new high when 
differences of opinion among policy makers encouraged President Trump to declare a 
national emergency in order to build a wall across the United States/Mexican border. 
Although the debate surrounding immigration policy is strong now, immigration has been 
an ongoing topic in the United States for hundreds of years. Building a wall between the 
United States and Mexico would not be the first time policy makers have attempted to 
restrict the flow of immigrants into the country. On May 6, 1882, a federal law called the 
Chinese Exclusion Act was signed, which excluded the immigration of all Chinese 
laborers. Immigrants have been a long standing issue in the U.S. as natives fear what the 
increased competition in the labor force means for them. 
There has been significant research dedicated to answering the question of 
whether immigrants help, or hurt the economy. Often times, there is evidence on both 
sides of the argument, suggesting that the truth lie somewhere in the middle. One 
interesting study was focused on the Mariel Boat-lift Crisis, which was a naturally 
occurring economic phenomenon in which about 125,000 Cubans migrated to Florida. 
Economist, David Card studied the impact of the Mariel immigrants and found that there 
was virtually no impact on the wages, or unemployment rates of unskilled workers (Card 
(1990)). However, further research conducted by George Borjas suggested that the Mariel 
immigrants caused a 10% to 30% decrease in wages among high school dropouts in 
Miami (Borjas (2017)). Immigration expert Giovanni Peri later analyzed the effect of the 
Mariel immigrants using synthetic control and determined that there was no significant 
difference in wages for Miami workers (Peri and Yasenov (2018)). Indeed, Geoffrey 
Keeton expressed in the same paper when explaining immigrant migration flows that they 
increased labor imbalance in some areas, while reducing them in others (Keeton and 
Newton (2005)). 
As shown above, when looking at immigration over time, it is sometimes difficult 
to determine exactly it effects the economy. The purpose of this paper is to help shed 
more light on what impact immigration has on the economy. Using event studies 
surrounding the Immigration Act of 1990 and Temporary Protected Status of Honduras 
and Nicaragua in 1999, I monitor stock prices of agricultural, construction, and 
manufacturing firms. Results show that indeed cumulative abnormal returns are positive 
and significant for various time windows surrounding these events. For the Immigration 
Act of 1990, three-day CARs are approximately 0.0083 suggesting that, relative to the 
market, treated firms (agriculture, construction, and manufacturing) increased about 
0.83% during the three-day period surrounding the signing of the Immigration Act. When 
examining the 1999 TPS order, three-day CARs are approximately 0.0213 suggesting 
that, relative to the market, treated firms increased about 2.13%. These results are 
noteworthy, as it shows the immediate unbiased reaction of the market in response to 
what can be perceived as an increase in immigrant labor. Positive abnormal returns 
suggest that agricultural, construction, and manufacturing companies would benefit from 
permitting immigrants to work in the United States legally. 
Additionally, I use regression analysis to estimate what forces may be driving the 
CARs to be positive. The OLS models attempt to determine which, if any of the treated 
firm types drive the positive and significant CARs. For the immigration act of 1990, 
construction and manufacturing have positive coefficients of 0.0529 and 0.0147, with 
construction being slightly significant and manufacturing being insignificant. However, 
with the 1999 TPS order, construction and manufacturing had coefficients of -0.0240 and 
0.0330. Construction being insignificant and manufacturing being slightly significant. 
These results seem to suggest that, if anything, manufacturing firms are driving the 
unusually large CARs during the periods surrounding these immigration events. 
Immigration Act of 1990 and Temporary Protected Status 
On November 29, 1990, the Immigration Act was signed by George H. W. Bush. 
The new bill increased the number of visas granted to immigrants from 530,000 per year, 
to 700,000 per year from 1992-1994 and then 675,000 visas per year every year after 
1994 (Leiden and Neal (1990)). The new bill effectively increased the number of visas by 
over 27% per year. The Immigration Act also describes in great detail different nuances 
of issuing visas, such as, family-based immigration, employment-based immigration, 
“diversity” immigration, and etcetera1. 
As part of the Immigration Act of 1990, Title III had a “temporary protected 
status” clause. The clause grants illegal aliens to have legal residency in the United States 
for up to eighteen months2. The Attorney General must first designate “temporary 
protected status” to nations that are in the midst of civil conflict, natural disaster, or other 
extraordinary circumstances that make the alien’s return unsafe (Leiden and Neal 
(1990)). In order for aliens to qualify for TPS, they must be continually physically 
present in the United States since the date of the country’s TPS designation (Leiden and 
Neal (1990)). 
These events are particularly interesting to this study, because they provide a 
natural instance in which I can capture immediate market expectations regarding 
immigration policy. Since firms that may be at a higher disposition to hire unskilled 
workers would benefit from an increase in the supply of immigrant labor, it would make 
sense that these policies would positively impact them. 
Data 
Using the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) database, I gathered 
daily stock price data for all publicly traded agricultural, construction, and manufacturing 
                                                        
1 For a comprehensive report on the Immigration Act, see (Leiden and Neal (1990)). 
2 TPS can be renewed if unsafe conditions persist (Leiden and Neal (1990)). 
firms. Using the CRSP data, I calculate the CARs for each event against the CRSP value-
weighted market index, which is the value-weighted mean return of all publicly traded 
firms available on CRSP. 
Additionally, I obtain daily information on stocks such as price, market cap, 
turnover, volatility, and whether or not the company is on the New York Stock Exchange. 
Price is the close stock price on the day of the event. Market Cap is the market 
capitalization on the day of the event. Turnover is the ratio of daily volume (on the event 
day) scaled by shares outstanding. Volatility is calculated following Alizadeh, Brandt, 
and Diebold (2002) as the difference between the natural log of the daily high price and 
the natural log of the daily low price. These variables are used as control variables when I 
estimate my OLS model to find the driving force of the CARs. 
Model 
I use two different models in my analysis. The purpose of the first model is to 
obtain the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the treated firms (agriculture, 
construction, and manufacturing). I estimate the cumulative abnormal returns first by 
using the following time series model that spans 209 days before the event date: 
Rt = α + βRm,t + εt 
From the time series model, we can derive the following model: 
εt = Rt - α - βRm,t   
 
I then add up the residuals over the event window, which estimates the returns 
above the stock market. I used the value weighted index from CRSP as my benchmark 
which controls for firm size. If the CARs are positive, it suggests that the treated firms 
outperformed the value weighted index, while negative CARs indicate under-
performance compared to the value weighted index. 
I estimate CAR(-10,10), CAR(-5,5), CAR(-3,3), CAR(-2,2), CAR(-1,1), and 
CAR(0,1). CAR(-10,10) estimates returns ten days prior to the event and ten days after, 
spanning twenty-one days total, since we include the event day at day 0. Every other 
CAR’s event window uses the same approach. For example, CAR(-5,5) estimates returns 
five days before the event, and five days after, spanning eleven days total. Over every 
event window that I estimated, I found that all CARs for both the Immigration Act of 
1990, and Temporary Protected Status of 1999 were positive. 
The second model I use is a simple OLS regression that signals what forces are 
driving the CARs to be positive. My dependent variables are CAR(-5,5), and CAR(-1,1), 
which are cumulative abnormal returns over an 11-day and 3-day period. The main 
independent variables in focus are Construction, Manufacturing, and Agriculture, which 
are dummy variables that signal if the firm is part of the treated group. I also included the 
following variables: ln(MktCap) to control for firm size, Price, Turnover, Volatility and 
NYSE (whether or not the firm is on the New York Stock Exchange). I included these 
variables to help control for other factors that could be driving the CARs. 
Results 
The appendix contains all of my results. Tables 1, and 2 show the summary 
statistics (mean, standard deviation, 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile) for all 
the variables in the sample of the Immigration Act of 1990, and Temporary Protected 
Status of 1999. The summary statistics are divided into Panels A, B, and C, where Panel 
A describes the summary statistics for agricultural firms, Panel B describes the summary 
statistics for construction firms, and Panel C describes the summary statistics for 
manufacturing firms. 
Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 show the estimated means, medians, t-statistics and sample 
size for each CAR that I estimated. Table 3 reports the estimated CARs for the average 
firm surrounding the Immigration Act of 1990. It is noteworthy to point out that all CARs 
have positive means. CAR(-10,10) has the highest mean of 3.12%, while CAR(-3,3) has 
the lowest mean of 0.12%. All of the CARs in Table 3 are highly significant, with the 
exception of CAR(-3,3). The high t-statistics, and positive CARs suggest with high 
confidence that the abnormal returns are different from zero. 
Table 4 is the standard event study for all firms surrounding 1999 TPS. Again, I 
find that all CARs have positive means. CAR(-10,10) again has the maximum mean of 
10.03%, while CAR(0,1) has the minimum mean of 0.68%. All t-statistics are highly 
significant in this calculation. One explanation as to why the t-statistics are much greater 
in Table 4 than in Table 3 could come from the larger sample size. Table 4 has over 600 
more observations than Table 3. As the sample size increases, the variance of the 
parameter estimates decreases, giving greater confidence. It is also possible that TPS is a 
better event, as it occurred more suddenly than the signing of the Immigration Act. 
Table 5 shows the estimated CARs by firm type for the Immigration Act of 1990. 
This time, I only estimate CARs for two different even windows (CAR(-5,5), and CAR(-
1,1)). Notice that the sample size varies drastically depending on the firm type. There 
only nineteen agricultural firms, and fifty-two construction firms. By contrast, there are a 
total of 2,341 manufacturing firms. Since the sample size is small for agricultural and 
construction firms, I am less likely to find significance. However, I still estimate 
moderate to strong significance for construction and manufacturing firms. For the 
construction firms, I estimate a mean CAR(-5,5) of 5.88%, while the manufacturing firms 
mean for CAR(-5,5) is 1.86%. 
Table 6 shows the resulting CARs by firm type surrounding 1999 TPS. Again, 
there are few agricultural, and construction firms, making it difficult to have significance 
in the t-statistics. However, CAR(-5,5) and CAR(-1,1) for manufacturing firms have 
large, and statistically significant means of 9.35%, and 2.20% respectively. 
In Table 7, I estimate an OLS regression using cross-sectional data to try and 
determine what variables are driving the CARs surrounding the Immigration Act of 1990. 
My dependent variables are CAR(-5,5), and CAR(-1,1). The independent variables of 
focus are Construction, and Manufacturing. Construction and Manufacturing are dummy 
variables used to estimate how firm type may impact the dependent variable. I have also 
included Ln(MktCap), Price, Turnover, Volatility, and NYSE as control variables. Little 
can be said about this model. While Construction and Manufacturing have positive 
coefficients, they are not statistically significant. The models carry little significance as 
well, with adjusted 𝑅2 of 0.0014 and -0.0001. 
In Table 8, I repeat the methodology used in Table 7. However, this time I am 
using regression analysis to find what factors are driving the CARs surrounding 1999 
TPS. Again, the coefficients for Construction and Manufacturing are insignificant. 
Although, the OLS models to show greater significance with adjusted 𝑅2 of 0.1190 and 
0.1373. 
In Figure 1, I show the CARs for both the Immigration Act of 1990 and 1999 
TPS. The y-axis represents the value of the CAR, and the x-axis represents how many 
days before, or after day zero i.e. the event date. Figure 1 clearly illustrates that the CARs 
tend to be more positive around the event date. 
Conclusion 
This research adds to an already prolific field of study. While there has been 
extensive research done in the scope of immigration, to my knowledge, there has never 
been any research done on the impact that immigration policy has on financial markets. 
The models I develop yield interesting results, but are subject to limitations. 
One limitation of my analysis is the ambiguity of what impact the Immigration 
Act of 1990 and 1999 TPS had on the actual economy. Intuitively, one may be able to 
deduce that since agricultural, construction, and manufacturing firms benefited from 
these policies, there was a spillover effect in the economy, the likes of which benefited 
others. However, this is not explicitly shown in the models. 
There are trading strategies that can be implemented from my findings. For 
example, if you anticipate temporary protected status to be designated to countries that 
are similar to Honduras, and Nicaragua, you could invest in manufacturing, or 
construction companies. Based on my findings in Figure 1, an ideal time to short the 
shares would be sometime within a five day window of the event. This strategy could 
also cross over to other immigration related policies that would increase the supply of 
laborers from Central and South American countries. However, there is still risk in this 
strategy. According to my findings in the OLS regressions, firm type had an insignificant 
relationship with the CARs. Additionally, when looking at Figure 1, the combined firms 
from the Immigration Act of 1990 and 1999 TPS, there are several days in which the 
abnormal returns are negative. 
In spite of the shortcomings of the model, the CARs are positive and often 
significant surrounding the Immigration Act of 1990 and 1999 TPS. Even though prices 
are often random, and unpredictable, there is a potential strategy in anticipating abnormal 
returns surrounding immigration policy. Market expectations, which should be unbiased 
and rational, seem to believe that increasing the supply of immigrant labor, positively 
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